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We welcome the European Commission's proposal for a Regulation on the security of gas supply 
which, it is hoped, will be agreed at the Energy Council in May. The Regulation aims to help 
member states improve their gas security policies as ECFR argued the EU should do in a Policy 
Brief published before the gas crisis of January 20091. However, there remain some problems 
with the proposed Regulation, in particular the mechanism through which member states will be 
required to devise and implement gas security policies.  This note aims to outline how these 
problems can be resolved. 
Summary 
1.  The Commission’s proposal for a Regulation on the security of gas supply has the right 
ambition for Europe. However, it is at risk of being substantially weakened in the ongoing 
Council  negotiation.  To  make  it  a  European  policy  success  it  should  be  clarified  and 
simplified.  The  bottom-up  dimension  should  be  strengthened  so  that  the  text  is  less 
politically  contentious  for  member  states  and  more  effective  at  raising  the  ambition  of 
national gas supply security policies. 
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2.  The mechanism that will ensure that all member states devise and implement adequate gas 
security policies should be clarified. Of the two approaches present in the Regulation, a 
clear  choice  should  be  made  in  favour  of  a  policy  process  based  on  national  security 
assessments and national action plans. One or several supply standards could be given as 
indicative tools to be used in the assessments, not binding rules to be complied with. It 
would remove the incentive for member states to weaken the security of supply standards 
and with them the whole Regulation. 
3.  The policy process should be based on mandatory gas security assessments, performed in 
the context of regional gas security groups, leading to national action plans reviewed by the 
Commission and independent experts and made publicly available on the Internet. Such a 
process  would  serve the  following  purposes:  (1)  Reveal the  gas security  situation  in all 
member states; (2) Increase and share knowledge among member states about gas security 
policies and measures, including their cost; (3) Incentivise national governments to make 
gas security policy choices that are economically sensible and politically responsible. 
4.  Finally, we suggest a few simple dispositions that would allow removal of the category of 
“protected”  customers  and  the  disagreements  over  its  definition;  as  well  as  the  very 
complex, politically contentious and potentially impractical architecture involving different 
categories of emergency situations, measures to address them and levels of responsibility. 
I.  Putting the national gas security assessments first 
5.  The  objective  of  this  Regulation  is  clear:  that  all  member  states  address  gas  security 
seriously so that, when the next supply crisis hits, no country within the Union is at risk of 
significant economic losses, or worse. In the Commission’s proposal there are two largely 
conflicting approaches to achieving this2: 
a.  The first one consists of defining security of supply “standards” that, once applied 
by  all member states,  would guarantee a minimum level  of  security  of  supply 
across the EU. The most discussed of these rules is the “N-1” indicator. 
b.  The  second  approach  consists  of  asking  member  states  to  perform  “risk 
assessments” of their gas systems, based in part on the supply standards they 
have  to  comply  with.  Those  assessments  would  be  part  of  “preventive  action 
plans” that the Commission would then review. 
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6.  How those two approaches would interact in practice was, and still is, unclear. Requiring 
member states to perform risk assessments while at the same time asking them to comply 
with security of supply standards seems illogical: 
a.  The purpose of mandating gas security assessments is to reveal what degree of 
security a country enjoys and discover the cost of buying more insurance. On the 
basis of such an assessment the government can decide on a sensible minimum 
level of supply security for the country, and how to achieve it. 
b.  On  the  contrary,  devising  a  set  of  “standards”  that  all  member  states  should 
comply  with  amounts  to  mandating  a  uniform  minimum  level  of  security;  it 
makes national security assessments redundant. 
7.  To make the Regulation simpler, more coherent and easier to negotiate on at the Council a 
clear  choice  should  be  made  between  these  two  approaches:  top-down  (standards)  or 
bottom-up (security assessments). The negotiation at the Council so far has shown three 
clear trends: 
a.  The determination of the member states to weaken the standards. Arguably, we 
are already not far from a version where everybody complies with the standards 
ex ante. 
b.  The recognition that the risk assessment process and the national action plans are 
amongst the most valuable features of the Regulation. 
c.  The recognition that there should be more regional co-operation on gas security 
policy3. 
8.  The first of these three trends illustrates what the negotiation over the Directive 2004/67 
had already shown, namely: that the standards approach, however appealing at first glance, 
faces  serious  hurdles  in  an  EU  negotiation.  Mandating  an  arbitrary  minimum  level  of 
security contradicts the member states’ legitimate claim to define how much insurance they 
should buy and how and when to buy it. (See section II of this memo.) 
9.  On this background, the second and third trends create an opportunity to make a clear 
choice in favour of a bottom-up approach based on security assessments, national action 
plans and regional co-operation. (See section III of this memo.) 
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II.  Why member states weaken the gas supply security standards 
10.  The negotiation so far has resulted in a significant weakening of the standards, and the 
process is probably not over. 
11.  The fact that the “N-1” rule on the capacity of the supply infrastructure is highly disputable 
as an indication of gas supply security makes it easier for member states to justify weaker 
versions, but they would have weakened any rule. This is because in any case, an approach 
based on standards would mandate an arbitrary level of security. 
12.  There are very good reasons why member states resist such an approach. Let’s define gas 
supply security as the ability to meet final contracted energy demand in the face of a gas 
supply disruption. All member states already enjoy a certain degree of security which can 
always be increased, at a cost. Because the cost of attaining any given level of security can 
differ widely between countries, the sensible level of insurance will be country-specific. 
Moreover, most member states know little about this cost. Therefore, even if one assumes 
that social attitudes towards energy supply insecurity are the same everywhere, member 
states are bound to resist a centrally-defined minimum level of security – that is, unless 
they are absolutely certain to be above it already. 
13.  It is important to note that member states that are already very secure have no reason to 
push  for  tougher  standards  because  gas  security  is  not  a  pan-European  public  good: 
insecurity in Sofia, Riga or Warsaw does not translate into insecurity in Paris, Berlin or 
Rome; reciprocally, security produced in Slovakia can not be free-ridden upon in Slovenia. 
Even if all member states were ready to spend time and money on this problem (and there 
is currently a lot of goodwill and genuine interest all over Europe), given the nature of the 
issue at hand they would resist the imposition of a centrally-defined, meaningful standard. 
14.  Given the importance of security standard in the Commission’s proposal, there is a risk 
that,  as  they  keep  being  weakened  through  the  negotiation,  the  final  version  will  be 
substantively empty, irrespective of how formally sophisticated it is. This is reminiscent of 
the  negotiation  that  produced  the  notoriously  benign  Directive  2004/67,  the  original 
version of which did include a meaningful gas supply security standard4. 
15.  Gas supply security standards are appealing at first glance but are extremely difficult to 
devise and, more fundamentally, they are bound to be resisted by most member states. The 
other approach present in the Regulation, based on national gas security assessments and 
the negotiation of national action plans, is a more promising way to ensure that all EU 
member states address this problem adequately. A clear choice should be made in favour of 
the latter approach; standards could still be proposed as part of a methodology to perform 
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the security assessments, but not as a tool to mandate a minimum level of security across 
the EU. 
III.  An innovative European policy process 
16.  The Regulation should set up a bottom-up policy process associating member states, the 
Commission and independent experts working on a regional basis. This proposal builds 
upon what is already present in the latest versions of the proposal under the headings “risk 
assessments” and “regional co-operation”. 
17.  The policy process would serve the following purposes: 
a.  Reveal the gas security situation in all member states; 
b.  Increase and share knowledge among member states about gas security policies 
and measures, including their cost; 
c.  Incentivise  national  governments  to  make  gas  security  policy  choices  that  are 
economically sensible and politically responsible. 
18.  To that effect, the Regulation should: 
a.  Mandate in-depth national gas security assessment reports. The reports 
should include: 
i.  An evaluation of the level of security enjoyed by the country, that is the 
ability  of  each  member  states’  energy  system  to  meet  final  contracted 
energy demand in the face of gas supply disruptions of various severity, 
length and probability. This supposes a detailed appraisal of the policies in 
place, on top of an analysis of the risks of supply disruptions. 
ii.  An evaluation of the cost of improving gas security through various policy 
options. 
The Regulation could propose some guiding standards to frame the gas security 
assessment reports. Referring to ‘one-in-X years’ peak demand periods is clearly 
sensible. Referring to the loss of the major inflow into the gas system also makes 
sense,  though  the  specific  “N-1”  ratio  currently  proposed  in  the  Regulation  is 
clearly  not  sensible  for  many  countries5.  Generally  speaking,  member  states 
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should be advised to evaluate under what circumstances they would have to start 
interrupting gas customers involuntarily, and how likely those situations are. 
b.  Create regional gas security groups. The national assessment reports would 
be carried out in the context of regional gas security groups. It would ensure a 
degree of methodological consistency in the assessments among countries that 
have  somewhat  similar  gas  supply  set-ups  and  face  similar  risks  (especially 
reliance on the same transit routes). They would also ensure a level of mutual 
support  and  be  conducive  to  increased  regional  co-operation.  Beyond  the 
production of the national assessment reports, the regional groups would act as 
permanent platforms for member states to share knowledge and learn about gas 
security  and  associated  issues.  Regional  groups  would  receive  the  support  of 
third-party  experts  from  international  organisations,  universities  and 
consultancies. The Commission would participate as an observer. 
c.  Mandate  national  gas  security  action  plans  to  be  attached  to  the 
assessment reports. In the action plans governments would explain whether they 
are satisfied with the level of security they enjoy and, if not, how they intend to 
increase security of supply and over what timeframe. The national action plans 
would include an evaluation of the cost of the proposed measures and how they 
could be financed. The national action plans may include measures carried out in 
partnership with other member states and include joint proposals on how to share 
the cost. 
d.  Mandate a review of the assessments and action plans, carried out by 
teams of independent experts under the responsibility of the Commission. Based 
on these independent reviews the Commission would send written comments and 
suggestions to  the  national governments. These  could  include,  where  relevant, 
advice on subsidies or preferential loans that could be requested from European 
institutions in order to implement a more ambitious gas security policy than the 
one proposed in the national action plan. 
e.  Mandate  that  all  the  assessment  reports,  the  action  plans,  the 
reviewers’ reports and the Commission’s comments and suggestions 
be made publicly available on the Commission’s and national governments’ 
websites. This is very important if the governments are to be held responsible for 
their gas security choices by national politicians and opinion leaders. 
f.  Mandate  a  regular  update  of  the  assessment  reports  and  review 
process, for example every five years.   7
IV.  Simplifying the Regulation 
19.  Gas security is about meeting final contracted energy demand in the face of a gas supply 
disruption  or  extreme  weather  events.  Situations  may  happen  that  go  beyond  what  a 
member state has insured against and customers may have to be interrupted involuntarily 
(that could be defined as energy insecurity). The Regulation asks member states to define a 
category of “protected customers” including households at a minimum, which would have 
their supplies guaranteed for a number of days in case of extreme weather events or supply 
emergency (what the Commission called the “supply standard”). Moreover, the Regulation 
proposes a complex architecture whereby crises of various severities would be dealt with at 
various institutional levels and with measures that are “market-based” or not. 
20.  Those  categories  will  prove  very  difficult  to  define  precisely  for  technical  and  political 
reasons;  it  may  not  even  be  possible  to  answer  the  questions  that  member  states  are 
supposed to answer in their “emergency plans” (which type of measures would be used to 
address what type of emergencies). Moreover, the set up proposed by the Regulation to 
characterise and manage gas supply crises is almost certainly impractical, apart from being 
politically contentious6. In particular, it is not clear that declaring a “European emergency” 
would improve the ability to manage a crisis in the event that spontaneous contractual 
mechanisms and administrative measures implemented by member states still left some 
final energy demand unmet. 
21.  It  seems  that  a  few  simple  dispositions  would  be  sufficient  to  improve  emergency 
preparedness  at  member  state  and  regional  level  and  would  would  allow  a  drastic 
simplification of the Regulation. Given that the whole process described in section III of 
this memo is designed to make sure that all member states buy an appropriate level of 
insurance, the Regulation should abandon the reference to “protected customers” and deal 
with  the  issue  of  ‘gas  insecurity  management’  by  mandating  the  following  on  member 
states: 
a.  All  member  states  should  include,  in  their  network  codes  or  other  publicly 
available  documents,  clear  and  non-discriminatory  procedures  to  interrupt 
different categories of gas consumers, should this be required to manage a gas 
crisis. 
b.  All  member  states  should  carry  out,  at  least  once  a  year  and  under  the 
responsibility of the ministry in charge of energy, the energy regulatory authority 
or  another  institution,  gas  emergency  drills.  These  tests  could  involve,  among 
other aspects, the activation of interruptible gas contracts, the shifting of power 
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plants  to  alternative  fuels  and  the  (involuntary)  interruption  of  different 
categories  of  consumers.  They  should  also  include  the  practice  of  emergency 
regional  coordination,  including  simulation  of  gas  flows  when  the  Ukrainian 
corridor (or another supply infrastructure of regional significance) is disrupted. 
22.  Finally, the Commission should be commended for emphasising the importance of letting 
the internal market work in times of crisis. However, there is a risk in enacting specific 
prohibitions,  clearly  motivated  by  a  few  well-known  national  measures  (but  leaving 
unaddressed many other barriers to gas trading in Europe), that the Commission may not 
be able to uphold in front of a legal challenge; the whole Regulation may be weakened. The 
following approach could be preferable: 
a.  The  recitals  of  the  Regulation  should  reaffirm  that  a  pan-European  wholesale 
market for gas would have immense benefits in terms of supply security. It would 
make  it  easier  and  cheaper  for  any  member  states  to  attain  a  given  level  of 
security. 
b.  The  text  should  reaffirm  the  legal  principles  that  underpin  cross-border 
transactions  (be  it  gas  contracts,  transmission  capacity  contracts,  or  storage 
capacity contracts) and state that the Commission is going to actively pursue their 
enforcement against any provisions that would distort the internal market in the 
name of gas supply security. 
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